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Hundreds of Oregon bridges remain vulnerable to earthquake damage. Although 15-20 earthquakes of magnitude M>3.0 are felt each year in the 
Pacific Northwest, modern Seismic Design Specifications were not available or 
used for bridge design until early 1990. 
With a majority of state owned bridges designed and built between 1950 
and 1980, the state of Oregon would face a devastating post earthquake 
situation if a major event occurred in the state.  The Oregon Department of 
Transportation (ODOT) has begun a study to define the magnitude of the 
problem by evaluating the vulnerability of state highway bridges in western 
Oregon. This report is intended to be a first step in a comprehensive look at 
seismic risk to transportation systems that could include slides, fill slopes, 
local roads and bridges, and supply lines, such as fuel depots, electricity, 
water and sewer lines.  
This report marks the culmination of two years of study jointly conducted 
by  ODOT and Portland State University.  The study makes use of a computer 
program called REDARS2 that simulates damage to bridges within a 
transportation network.  It can predict ground motions for a specifi c location 
and magnitude of earthquake, resulting bridge damage and the cost of the 
damage, as well as the cost to the public for traffic delays due to detours 
around damaged bridges.  Estimated damage and delay costs are presented 
for major highways in Western Oregon, where most of the earthquake 
damage is predicted to occur.  
Research and analysis were done to identify the most vulnerable highway 
segments of the state highway system and to select appropriate earthquake 
scenarios.  This report, “Seismic Vulnerability of Oregon State Highway Bridges, 
Mitigation Strategies to Reduce Major Mobility Risks”, describes potential 
damage to State highway bridges from six representative earthquake scenarios 
that are thought most likely to occur in Oregon.  The study found that highway 
mobility would be severely reduced after a major Cascadia Subduction Zone 
event, as well as after a signifi cant crustal earthquake. US 101 would have 
dozens of failures that would be impassable due to bridge collapses.  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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All of the existing highways that connect US 101 to I-5 would be impassable 
due to bridge collapse and major damage.  Small segments of I-5 would be 
useable because a number of those bridges have been replaced since 1990, 
including many in the OTIA III Program, but many older, obsolete overpasses 
would collapse and block the through lanes, and many older river crossings 
would be impassable. Some essential services that depend on the Willamette 
River crossings in Portland would be affected as well.
The report also considers possible mitigation, including bridge retrofi t and 
strengthening to withstand seismic damage.  However, current  available highway 
funding is inadequate to achieve a minimum standard of seismic safety even on 
the Interstate and other critical routes.  Further research is needed before the 
State can fully realize the benefi ts of the analysis done so far to establish the 
highest priority for retrofi t using the limitied Bridge Program funding.  It would be 
very useful in developing a coordinated mitigation program if a comprehensive 
study of seismic vulnerability and risk for the entire transportation system was 
conducted.  The goal of such a study would be to defi ne an overall perspective 
on resulting mobility impacts and loss of basic, critical supply lines after a major 
seismic event.  This comprehensive study is needed to correctly identify and 
program vital bridges for Phase 1 or Phase 2 seismic retrofi ts, or replacement 
of these bridges with seismically adequate structures to ensure that access to 
critical facilities is maintained.
ODOT will continue to work with highway stakeholders to refi ne the plans for 
possible mitigation and emergency response when an earthquake hits.  The 
report also recommends that further study be conducted to update existing 
lifeline route designations to be consistent with new bridges built in the last 
fi fteen years since the original routes were identifi ed and to ensure access is 
maintained to critical supplies and facilities.  Although much work remains to 
be done and many future decisions made, we believe this report represents a 
major milestone.  It is a signifi cant contribution that highlights a pressing need 
for the current and future safety of Oregon’s highway system.  
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Figure 1.1 : Partial wall and parapet collapse, Klamath 
Falls, Oregon earthquake; Source: Earthquakes and 
Volcanoes, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1993
In the past, Oregon was considered to be a region of relatively low seismicity and earthquake occurrence. Very few strong earthquakes (M>6.0) have 
ever been recorded in Oregon even though many smaller earthquakes occur 
each year. Reference is often made to the more frequent occurrence of large 
earthquakes in both Washington and California. However, the recorded 
history of Oregon is accurately documented for a period of only about 150 
years; a very short period of time in geologic terms. About 25 years ago, 
paleoseismic studies and other geologic research began to be conducted that 
resulted in support for the theory that major seismic events have occurred, 
and will continue to occur, in Oregon. Geologic evidence has been discovered 
and presented by several researchers supporting the likelihood of large 
subduction zone earthquakes, with magnitudes greater than 8.0, occurring in 
the future somewhere along the Oregon coast. Other geologic evidence has 
been discovered which supports a 
high probability of strong crustal 
earthquakes occurring in several 
areas throughout Oregon. Shallow 
crustal earthquakes are known to 
occur routinely throughout the 
western part of the state. In 1993, 
three notable crustal earthquakes 
occurred in Oregon; Scotts Mills 
(5.6 magnitude) and Klamath Falls 
quakes (5.9 and 6.0 magnitude). 
The total damage cost resulting 
from these events was about 
$40 million and included two 
fatalities.
BACKGROUND
Figure 1.3 : Cascadia 
Subduction Zone 
plate boundary; 




Figure 1.2 : Map of 
selected earthquakes 
for Oregon (1841–




Geology and Mineral 
Industries, Open File 
Report O-03-02
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The west coast of Oregon 
is located along the 
western margin of the 
North American tectonic 
plate near the boundary 
of the Juan de Fuca plate 
(Figure 1.3). Relative plate 
motions result in the Juan 
de Fuca plate sinking 
below the North American plate along the Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) 
and beneath the coast of Northern California, Oregon, Washington and British 
Columbia. The North American plate is also deforming as it accommodates 
strain along it’s boundaries with the Pacific and Juan de Fuca plates. While 
earthquakes along this zone occur infrequently, plate movement can produce 
major earthquakes. In addition, western Oregon is underlain by a large and 
complex system of faults that can also produce damaging earthquakes. These 
smaller faults produce lower magnitude events, but the ground shaking and 
damage from these events can be great to structures located nearby.
As shown in Figure 1.2, earthquakes less than about M 6.0 occur routinely throughout Oregon. Most of these instrumentally 
recorded earthquakes have magnitudes less than 4.0 and very few 
significant historical earthquakes have been recorded east of the 
Cascade Range. Nearly 17,000 earthquakes of magnitude 1.0 to 6.0 
have been recorded in Oregon and Washington since 1970. About 15–
20 earthquakes a year are felt in the Pacific Northwest (M>3.0). 
Figure 1.4: Principal earthquake sources for major earthquake in Oregon; Source: Shoreland 
Solutions. Chronic Coastal Natural Hazards Model Overlay Zone, Salem, OR: Oregon 
Department of Land Conservation and Development (1998) Technical Guide-3
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Tectonic plate interactions result in the creation of faults and folds that generate most of the large earthquakes in the Pacific Northwest. Based on 
plate tectonic models and historical observations, major earthquakes in the 
Pacific NW that would affect Oregon bridges have three principal origins as 
described below and depicted in Figure 1.4; 
Subduction Zone Interplate thrust earthquakes. These are very large 1. 
earthquakes originating at the boundary of the North American and Juan 
de Fuca plates, (e.g. Mw 9 on Jan. 26, 1700)
Deep (25-45 miles) Intraplate earthquakes resulting from internal stresses 2. 
associated with the bending and arching of the Juan de Fuca plate as it is 
subducted beneath the North American plate. (e.g. Feb. 28, 2001, Mw 6.8 
Nisqually earthquake)
Shallow crustal earthquakes (<12 miles) generated within the different 3. 
seismotectonic provinces in the overlying North American plate. (e.g. Mar. 
25, 1993, ML 5.7 Scotts Mills earthquake)
Figure 1.5: Fault map of Oregon; Source: Compiled by Robert Langridge of University of Oregon
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Geologists have indicated in recent years that the question is not if a catastrophic earthquake will occur in Oregon, but when one will occur. 
Evidence indicates that off the Oregon coast, Cascadia Subduction Zone 
earthquakes of magnitude 8.0 or greater have occurred on average about every 
500 years, most recently in late January of 1700 A.D. Recent research by the 
Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI press release; 
Oregonian, April, 2009 [1] ) indicates subduction zone earthquakes could occur 
on an average of every 300–350 years instead of about every 500 years and 
there’s a 40 percent chance a powerful earthquake will occur along the Oregon 
coast in the next 50 years (80 percent chance along the southern margin). 
A map of Oregon showing all active faults is shown in Figure 1.5. Faults shown in 
red are the most recently active faults (younger than 10,000 years).
Figure 1.6 : Peak Horizontal Acceleration with 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years; Source: USGS 2002 Seismic Hazard Map
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The following table provides a brief summary of the primary earthquake 
sources affecting Oregon, their approximate frequency of occurrence, range of 
magnitude and most recent activity.
Oregon bridge sites are also vulnerable to damage because of their topography 
and geology.  Soil profiles at many bridge sites are often prone to liquefaction 
during the shaking that would occur during an earthquake. Depending on the 
location of the epicenter of the earthquake, areas receiving major damage from 
an 8.0 – 9.0 magnitude subduction zone earthquake would include most of the 
counties in Western Oregon, including heavily populated metropolitan areas 
such as Portland, Salem, and Eugene.
The current seismic hazard in Oregon is best represented by a 
seismic hazard map showing contours 
of peak ground acceleration.  The 
United States Geological Survey 
(USGS) seismic hazard map shown in 
Figure 1.6 is a map currently in use by 
Oregon Department of  Transportation 
(ODOT) for the seismic design of 
bridges. It can be seen from this map 
that the coast and most of the western 
portion of Oregon is in a relatively 
high seismic hazard area similar to 
that of Washington and California.
Table 1.1 : Primary Earthquakes Aff ecting Oregon
Source  Magnitude Frequency  Latest Occurrence 
Crustal  M<5.5 15 – 20/yrs Annually
   M≥5.5 ??? 1993: Scotts Mills & Klamath Falls
CSZ*  M ≥ 8.0 Every 350–500 yrs Jan., 1700
Intraplate  M = 4 .0–7.0  Every 30–50 yrs Feb., 2009: M4.1, Grants Pass, OR
* Cascadia Subduction Zone Interplate event
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Prior to 1958, seismic loading was typically not considered in the design of bridges. From 1958–1974 all bridges were designed for a seismic force 
equal to 2%–6% of structure weight (.02g-.06g). In 1971, the San Fernando 
earthquake marked a major turning point in the seismic design of bridges and 
began the development of a new set of design criteria for bridges in the US.  In 
1975 the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Offi  cials 
(AASHTO) adopted Interim Specifi cations which were based largely on design 
criteria developed by the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) in 
1973.  These code provisions were used by ODOT from 1975–1990. They resulted 
in an increased seismic design force equal to 8%-12% of structure weight and 
the introduction of ductile reinforcing details (Refer to Section 3 for further 
discussion regarding ductile reinforcement). 
In 1989, the Loma Prieta earthquake in northern California prompted ODOT 
to take a very close look at the overall seismic hazard in Oregon and the 
affects of this hazard on bridge design.   During this time, several earthquake 
hazard studies were taking place and various researchers and agencies were 
investigating and uncovering new evidence of an increased level of seismic 
hazard in Oregon. Field evidence was discovered indicating that large 
subduction zone earthquakes had occurred along the Oregon coast regularly 
in the past and active crustal faults were discovered in many other areas 
of the state that were not previously accounted for in the standard seismic 
hazard maps in use at that time.  These newly discovered sources indicated a 
much higher level of seismic risk to ODOT bridges than previously accounted 
for in many parts of the state.  At this time a seismic hazard study was also 
being conducted by Washington State University (WSU) for the Washington 
Department of Transportation (WSDOT) [2], which resulted in an increase in 
seismic design ground motions for much of Washington State, above the values 
obtained from the AASHTO seismic design maps in use at that time.  WSDOT 
adopted the results of this study for their use in seismic design. The area of this 
study extended into northern portions of Oregon, including Portland, and gave 
some insight into the potential increase in the seismic hazard in these areas. 
In light of this new information, in 1990, ODOT decided to develop a statewide 
seismic design map of peak ground acceleration (PGA), based in part on the WSU 
report and also on recommendations from DOGAMI.  This map was adopted for 
use in seismic design on an interim basis until a thorough study of the seismic 
hazard in Oregon could be completed. The PGA values on this interim map 
were significantly greater for much of the state than the values used before 
DEVELOPMENT OF ODOT SEISMIC 
DESIGN STANDARDS 
Figure 2.1 : Bridge pier damage 
resulting from liquefaction 
and lateral displacement of 
foundation soils (Yachiyo Bridge, 
1964 Niigata, Japan)
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from the AASHTO hazard map, most notably in the Portland metropolitan area 
and along the southern Oregon coast. Also at this time (1990), a new AASHTO 
guide specification for the seismic design of bridges was adopted by ODOT for 
use with the new interim ground motion map.
In 1991, ODOT contracted with an earthquake engineering consultant fi rm 
(Geomatrix, Inc.) to conduct a seismic hazard analysis of Oregon and develop 
new seismic hazard design maps specifi cally for use in ODOT bridge design. The 
resulting report [3] is an extensive study and compilation of all known active fault 
sources aff ecting Oregon and included the latest consensus on ground motion 
characteristics of the Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ). This report, titled “Seismic 
Design Mapping, State of Oregon”, is still considered to be one of the most 
important references documenting the seismic hazard in Oregon. The seismic 
hazard maps produced in this report for a 500-year return event were adopted by 
ODOT in 1995 and used for seismic design until 2004.  In 2004, ODOT decided to 
adopt the 2002 USGS seismic hazard maps which are similar in level of hazard to 
the Geomatrix maps that were already in use.  Also at this time, ODOT adopted a 
1000-year return event for use in design (higher seismic design level) which was 
later adopted by AASHTO as the standard level of design hazard nationwide.   
Another source of bridge damage resulting from earthquake ground shaking is 
liquefaction of the foundation soils. Liquefaction occurs when loose, saturated, 
sandy soils are subjected to ground shaking caused by earthquakes. This shaking 
creates excess porewater pressure in the soil and the soil loses most of its strength. 
Liquefi ed foundation soils can settle and also cause large horizontal ground 
displacements (lateral spread) which can produce very large loads on bridge 
foundations, to the point of causing bridge collapse. 
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Figure 2.1 is an example of bridge damage resulting from liquefaction of 
foundation soils. The eff ects of liquefaction on bridge performance was not 
accounted for in bridge design until about 1995 and mitigation of liquefaction 
damage potential was not included in routine bridge design until 2004.  Therefore, 
bridges constructed before 1995 were not evaluated or designed for the eff ects 
of liquefaction or lateral spread. Bridges constructed between 1995 and about 
2004 were evaluated for liquefaction potential, and if liquefaction was possible, 
these eff ects were partially incorporated into bridge design. However, sites with 
the potential of lateral spreading were typically not mitigated.    
Beginning in 2004, liquefaction leading to lateral spreading were all evaluated 
including the need for designing and constructing mitigation measures if 
necessary.  
Table 2.1 : A summary of the important events and changes made to the seismic design codes and ground motion hazard 
levels over time are presented.
Year AASHTO Design Code  Ground Motion Hazard
Prior 1958 Seismic loading typically not considered N/A
1958-1974 Bridges designed for seismic force N/A
 equal to 2%-6% of structure weight
1971   San Fernando, CA Earthquake
1975-1990 Bridges designed for seismic force equal to 1975: Seismic Hazard Maps fi rst appear  
 8%-12% of structure weight based on  in AASHTO; (Oregon in Zones 1 & 2)   
 adopted AASHTO Interim Specs.
1989   Loma Prieta, CA Earthquake
1990 Adopt 1983 AASHTO Seismic Design Guide Adopt 1990 interim ODOT Seismic   
    Specifi cations Hazard Map 
1995    Adopt 500-yr. Geomatrix design hazard  
    maps (includes subduction zone event)
2004 Include liquefaction eff ects into Adopt 2002 USGS hazard maps; Adopted  
 routine design  1000-yr base design event
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Bridges located in the western portion of the state (west of the Cascade Range) 
or in the Klamath Falls area, constructed prior to 1975, are highly vulnerable with 
significant potential for damage and collapse. Bridges constructed between 
1975 and 1995 in these areas are considered to have a moderate potential for 
damage or collapse. Bridges constructed after 1995 are much less vulnerable 
to damage or collapse since they were designed based on levels of ground 
shaking close to what is in use today and with much better design detailing. 
However, some of these bridges may still be vulnerable to significant damage 
or collapse if located in areas with liquefiable soils since liquefaction effects 
were not fully taken into account, or mitigated for, until about 2004. In 2004, 
ODOT adopted a higher level of design ground motion (1000-yr return event) 
for use in combination with the no-collapse (life safety) criteria and also began 
designing and mitigating for the effects of liquefaction on bridge performance. 
Bridges designed since 2004 are based on ground motions, structural analysis, 
design detailing and liquefaction effects that are consistent with current design 
standards.
The potential for structural collapse of bridges constructed during specific time 
periods, when subjected to earthquake forces, is shown in the table below. The 
bridge collapse potential reflects the design codes that were in effect during 
each given time period. 
 Year Constructed Structure  Collapse  Potential
Prior to 1975  Signifi cant
 1975-1994  Moderate
 1995-2004  Low
 2004-present  Very Low
Table 2.2 : Structure collapse potential relative to year constructed
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CURRENT ODOT SEISMIC DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
ODOT bridges are currently designed to at least meet the national bridge design standards established by AASHTO. This includes all standards 
related to seismic bridge design. Under these code requirements bridges are 
primarily designed to meet a life-safety performance standard, which means 
the bridge has a very low probability of collapse when subjected to earthquakes 
that are most likely to occur over the life of the structure.
The level of ground shaking used in the design is associated with earthquakes 
that on average could occur approximately every 1000 years.  Even under the 
high level of shaking the bridge is designed for, it could likely suffer some 
amount of structural damage which would require repair. Like any natural 
event, an even larger earthquake could occur, resulting in larger movements 
than bridges are designed for. Bridge damage could be extensive enough 
to require complete replacement. This design philosophy is used because it 
would be too expensive to design bridges for the highest possible, but very 
rare, earthquakes.
ODOT seismic bridge design also includes a design check for a lower level 
earthquake event that occurs more frequently, on average approximately 
every 500 years. Under this lower level of shaking, the bridge is designed to 
withstand earthquake loads with minimal damage, such that the bridge can 
be opened to emergency traffic within 72 hours after an event. The inclusion 
of this additional lower level (“serviceability”) design is above the standard 
performance requirements prescribed by the AASHTO code.  
18
Potential Damage And Failure Mechanisms
Ground shaking from earthquakes cause structures to also shake.  For bridges, shaking occurs primarily in horizontal directions.  This horizontal 
shaking and associated movement can cause damage to bridges. 
A typical bridge is a combination of the following parts:
Deck•  : The surface you drive on.
Railing•  : Barrier at the edge of the deck.
Girders•  : Members parallel to the roadway that support the deck.
Cap•  : Members that support the girders.
Columns•  :  Vertical members that transfer loads from the cap to the foundation.
Foundation•  : Members that transfer column loads into the ground.  This 
generally includes a concrete footing that is either supported by the ground 
or supported by piling.  Bridge ends (abutments) often do not have columns. 
For this case, the cap is connected directly to the footing and/or piling.
Piling•  : Vertical members that transfer foundation (footing) loads into the 









Figure 3.1 : Typical Bridge Components
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The deck, railing and girders together are called the “Superstructure”.  All 
other elements (cap, columns, footings and piling) together are called the 
“Substructure.”  The distinction between superstructure and substructure is 
important when considering potential damage from earthquakes and ways to 
retrofit a structure to avoid damage.    
The horizontal movement from an earthquake typically does not do any damage 
to decks, railing or girders.  These elements generally have robust connections 
between them which can easily accommodate horizontal earthquake forces. 
The connection between the superstructure and the substructure, however, is 
a major source of concern.
Bridge superstructure elements expand and contract (i.e., change length) with 
temperature changes as part of the normal bridge life.  These movements are 
often accommodated by placing bearings underneath girders.  These bearings 
provide a load transfer mechanism between the girders and cap.  Bearings 
accommodate the large vertical loads (weight of the superstructure and vehicle 
loads) and transfer them from girders to cap, but also allow the small amount 
of horizontal movement that results from changes in temperature.
Figure 3.2 :  Rocker Bearings
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Although bearings are very good at accommodating temperature movements, 
they are often poor at resisting horizontal earthquake loads.  In some cases, 
support for a bearing may be compromised if an earthquake causes excessive 
horizontal movement of a girder.  In extreme cases, bearings can topple.  
Another approach to accommodating temperature movements is through 
use of in-span hinges.  In-span hinges can also be poor at resisting horizontal 
earthquake loads.  Use of in-span hinges is less common in modern bridges.
Figure 3.3 :  Failed Rocker Bearings (Yamhill River Bridge)
Figure 3.4 :  In-Span Hinges
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Damage to bearings or hinges can be catastrophic.  The result can range from 
an impassable gap or bump in the roadway (vertical displacement of adjacent 
deck segments) to complete collapse of a span. 
Strengthening bridges to prevent damage is called “retrofitting”. Retrofitting 
bridges against bearing and hinge failures can involve any of the following: 
Replace • unstable bearings with stable bearings. 
Provide additional seat width. • 
Limit movement of girders parallel to roadway using restrainers.• 
Limit movement of girders perpendicular to roadway using shear lugs.• 
The cost of performing earthquake retrofit can be significant.  The ODOT 
Bridge Program is funded at a level to maintain freight mobility and preserve 
major, high cost existing bridges, but not to retrofit existing bridges that are 
inadequate for seismic loading.  Because of this, ODOT can only perform very 
limited earthquake retrofitting and must approach it in two stages.  Phase I 
retrofitting includes only the items listed above.  The essential goal of Phase I 
retrofitting is “life safety”.  This is accomplished with retrofit details designed to 
prevent the superstructure from separating from the substructure and thereby 
preventing collapse of a span. This type of retrofit has proven to be highly 
Figure 3.5:  Restrainer at Pier
Restrainer Cables
Restrainer Cables
Figure 3.6 : Cost-to-Benefi t Comparison for Seismic Retrofi t



































Increasing Retrofi t Cost
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effective for moderate earthquakes. However, since substructure deficiencies 
are not addressed, bridge collapse in a large earthquake is possible.
Phase II retrofitting includes strengthening the substructure elements.  This 
includes caps, columns, footings and piling.  The primary goal of Phase II 
retrofitting is also “life safety”.  Since Phase II retrofitting  involves strengthening 
substructure elements, the result is a final structure that can provide “life 
safety” for the maximum anticipated earthquake. The cost of Phase II work is 
typically three times that of Phase I.  To date, ODOT has performed very limited 
Phase II retrofit work.
Caltrans also used a similar phased approach for earthquake retrofitting.  Based 
on California’s experience and limited funding in the Bridge Program, ODOT 
has chosen to perform Phase I retrofitting only when other rehabilitation is 
needed on a specific bridge. Our current approach provides a moderate level 
of protection for isolated retrofitted bridges at a cost that is consistent with the 
current Bridge Program funding level.  Since complete retrofit carries a much 
higher cost, this type of phased approach maximizes the benefit gained from 
each retrofit dollar spent.
Figure 3.7 : Concrete Column Detailing
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Horizontal movement from earthquakes can damage columns, footings and 
piling of older bridges that do not have adequate seismic details.  Column 
damage of older bridges as shown in Figure 3.7 below can be minimized by using 
“ductile” details.  Ductile details allow a column to sway back and forth several 
times without significant damage.  Ductile detailing involves ensuring vertical 
column bars have adequate containment or lateral support.  With adequate 
lateral support, columns can bend without breaking.  This design concept has 
been implemented on all ODOT bridges designed within the last 25 years. 
Modern bridges are designed using tighter spacing for lateral reinforcing steel. 
This tighter spacing provides the necessary lateral support to ensure ductile 
performance.  Earthquake retrofit for older columns would involve wrapping a 
column with steel or composite fabric to increase the lateral support.
Since older bridges were designed for much lower earthquake forces, their 
foundations generally lack capacity to resist the expected horizontal loads. 
Retrofit of older foundations usually requires increasing the size of footings. 
Where foundations are supported by piling, more piles must be placed.  Since 
there is often limited room to work under existing bridges, foundation retrofit 
is both difficult and very costly.
The design philosophy for earthquake retrofit is similar to that of a new 
bridge.  Where reasonable, retrofits are designed such that the bridge will be 
serviceable for a moderate earthquake and provide collapse prevention (life-
safety) in a large earthquake.  However, it is not always possible to retrofit a 
bridge to the desired level without complete replacement.  Even under the 
best circumstances, a new bridge designed and built according to today’s 
standards would perform better than a retrofitted bridge.
Minor Surface Spalling 
Does Not Aff ect 
Column Capacity
Bent Vertical Rebar
Concrete Turned to Rubble
Non-Ductile Column Ductile Column
Broken Column Ties
Figure 3.8 : Seismic Retrofi t Concepts
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The following sketch illustrates the various substructure retrofi t concepts.
 
The concepts shown above are based on traditional Phase I and Phase 
II retrofitting concepts. “Base isolation” is another concept that can be 
considered in some unique circumstances. Base isolation involves placing 
ductile elements between the superstructure and substructure. This 
usually involves replacing existing bearings between the girders and caps 
with special base isolation bearings.  This type of bearing allows some 
horizontal movements, but limits the amount of earthquake shaking that 
can be transmitted from the substructure to the superstructure.  In this way, 
base isolation bearings “isolate” the superstructure from the earthquake to 
a certain extent.  In the end, the earthquake forces that must be resisted 
by the substructure can be dramatically reduced.  In some cases, it can 
eliminate the need for a Phase II retrofit.  Base isolation generally costs 
more than a normal Phase I retrofit, but is substantially less than Phase II 
retrofit.  This concept is not effective or practical on all structures, but is 
considered where it is practical.  The main span of the I-5 Marquam Bridge 
in Portland and the west approach spans for the I-205 Abernethy Bridge 
in West Linn are examples where base isolation was used.  In both cases, 
base isolation did not eliminate the need for a future Phase II retrofit, but 




Over 2500 bridges make up the highway system owned by ODOT. Each bridge is unique, but the inventory can be generally classified by the 
bridge type as depicted in Table 4.1. Girder, beam and slab bridges are the 
dominate bridge types in the Nation Bridge Inventory (NBI).
Table 4.1: Types of State Owned NBI Bridges in Oregon
Bridge Type Highway System Bridges
 Single Span Multi-Span 
Stringer/Girder 222 1094
Slab 274 296
Multiple Box Beam 89 291
Frame / Girder-Floorbeam 31 43




Single/Spread Box 12 15
Arch-Thru 9 5
Tunnel 9 0
Tee Beam 6 3
Movable-Bascule/Swing/Lift 9 4
Segmental Box Girder 0 1
Suspension 0 1
Other/Unclassifi ed 4 0
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The age of construction of bridges is also important when assessing seismic 
vulnerability because of the evolution of the seismology understanding of seismic 
risk as well as the engineering understanding of structural response and design 
to resist earthquake induced loads.  Figure 4.1 itemizes the year construction was 
completed and shows that 64% of bridges were constructed before the 1970s. 
In general, little consideration was given to seismic resistance prior to the San 
Fernando earthquake of 1971 (Roberts 1991), yet the majority of the inventory 
was built prior to that time. Furthermore, bridges completed before 1960 are 














































































Figure 4.1: Distribution of year of construction completion of Oregon’s State Highways bridges
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Early Seismic Vulnerability Studies
In February 1992, new evidence concerning Oregon’s earthquake risk prompted ODOT to investigate methods to prioritize ODOT bridges for seismic 
retrofit.  ODOT hired the consultant CH2M Hill for this task. The consultant 
investigated prioritization methods used by other agencies including Caltrans 
and WSDOT.  They also looked at typical bridge details used in Oregon. Using 
this information CH2M Hill developed, a prioritization algorithm unique to 
Oregon bridges.  
A final report was released in October of 1993 titled, “Prioritization of State 
Bridges for Seismic Retrofit”.  This report outlined a strategy and provided 
an algorithm to prioritize ODOT bridges for seismic retrofit. A ranking of 
bridges from most vulnerable to least vulnerable was provided.  This report 
also provided the first estimate of retrofit cost. The report included only state-
owned bridges. 
After release of the initial CH2M Hill study, a second project was initiated 
to include local agency bridges.  In November 1995, a report titled “Seismic 
Vulnerability of Local Agency Bridges” was released.  This was an interim report 
that documented the vulnerability of only local agency bridges.
In January 1997, the report “Prioritization of Oregon Bridges for Seismic 
Retrofit” was released.  This report was also prepared by CH2M Hill and 
included both state and local agency bridges.  The report included a ranking of 
all Oregon bridges.  A computer program was also provided so that ODOT and 
local agencies would be able to prepare rankings of their own bridges.  It also 
allowed bridge information to be updated as they were retrofitted or replaced 
with newer bridges. 
It should be noted that no liquefaction or soil information was included 
in the CH2M Hill reports. Although this information would have been very 
helpful, it was both cost and time prohibitive to include with the prioritization 
studies. Liquefaction issues were included later when potential projects were 
considered for funding. In most cases, bridges with significant liquefaction 
potential did not receive earthquake retrofit funding.
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Concurrent with the final CH2M Hill report, ODOT produced a list of lifeline 
routes. The lifetime routes were used in conjunction with the vulnerability 
report to select and prioritize bridges for retrofitting.  These lifeline routes were 
prepared with input from both ODOT and local agencies. The lifeline routes 
were prepared considering only earthquake impacts on the highway system 
with no identification of other critical infrastructure and supply lines, such as 
utilities, gasoline supply depots, or access to emergency supply depots.  
Routes were generally selected based on their likelihood of being available 
following an earthquake.  For  this reason, routes with fewer vulnerable bridges 
were often selected as a lifeline route instead of higher volume parallel routes 
with many vulnerable bridges.
It was anticipated that the original lifeline routes would be updated as bridges 
were retrofitted and more secure routes became available.  To date, however, 
no adjustments to the original lifeline routes have been made to account for 
replaced and retrofitted bridges.  For this reason, the lifeline routes are no longer 
considered to be the most effective or reliable routes available.  The lifeline 
routes were prepared only for the CH2M Hill prioritization and were never 
intended to be used for other emergency scenarios.  Since future prioritization 
will include a corridor strategy, it is clear that there is a need to create updated 
earthquake lifeline routes for emergency response purposes.
Use and implementation of the CH2M Hill studies are discussed in ODOT 
Seismic Mitigation Strategies section, page 51.
The top ranked bridge from the 1993 prioritization was the I-5 Boone Bridge 
at Wilsonville.  A Phase I retrofit project was then immediately initiated and 
completed in 1997.   
Prior to the CH2M Hill studies, the I-5 Marquam Bridge in Portland was the 
first Oregon bridge to receive an earthquake retrofit.  The Marquam Bridge 
is a double-deck structure that appears similar to the Cypress freeway that 
collapsed under the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in California.  At the time, 
ODOT was completing plans to widen the east approach to this bridge and a 
decision was made to add earthquake retrofit to the project.
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Cascadia Peril 2009 Exercise Model 
Oregon Emergency Management conducted a week long exercise on April 24-30, 2009 to assess the State’s emergency response to a 9.0 magnitude 
earthquake on the Cascadia Subduction Zone. ODOT participated by doing 
a desk exercise in the three western Regions. One specific task assigned to 
ODOT for this exercise was to provide organizers with the anticipated damage 
state of Oregon bridges after a similar earthquake. Because of the size, type 
and location of this earthquake, a large number of bridges would be affected. 
The narrow timeframe available to accomplish this task dictated the need for 
a quick and approximate approach to estimate the damage state after the 
simulated earthquake. The team assigned this task realized that there was 
not enough time to analyze each bridge’s potential vulnerability individually. 
Under these circumstances, the team decided to establish a set of criteria to 
categorize the condition of all Oregon bridges subjected to ground motions 
from the simulated event. The effort to make this report as practical as possible 
led to the establishment of the three following damage states: 
Serviceable;1.  for bridges experiencing very little to no damage and being 
serviceable right after a post earthquake inspection.
Damaged;2.  for bridges experiencing moderate to little damage, and 
requiring extensive repair work before re-opened to service.
Collapsed;3.  for bridges totally collapsed or with individual spans collapsed 
during this earthquake. A full or partial replacement of these bridges was 
anticipated.
The following criteria was utilized for determining the damage state of each 
bridge after the earthquake: 
a. The report titled “Prioritization of Oregon Bridges for Seismic Retrofit”, 
provided by CH2M HILL in January 1997, was used as a preliminary 
screening of Oregon bridge deficiencies. The report identified all 
major bridge deficiencies and placed them into Vulnerability Groups 
as described in Table 4.2. These Vulnerability Groups were then used 
in combination with estimates of PGA and other criteria to assess their 
potential damage state.
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b. All bridges experiencing a PGA of 0.15g or less will sustain no damage 
under this earthquake.
c. All single span bridges will experience no damage under this earthquake, 
given that the majority of them with previously identifi ed seismic 
deficiencies have been retrofitted already. 
d. Bridges falling under Vulnerability Groups 1A, 1D, 2A, 2B, 2C and S will be 
either “Damaged” if experiencing a PGA of 0.15g to 0.25g, or “Collapsed” if 
experiencing a PGA of 0.25g or higher.
e. Bridges falling under Vulnerability Group 3 and built before 1940 will be 
either “Damaged” for PGA between 0.15g and 0.25g, or will be “Collapsed” 
for PGA of 0.25g or higher.
Table 4.2 : Seismic Prioritization Model Vulnerability Groups
     Group No. Description
 1A Unstable bearings
 1B Stable bearing with inadequate anchorage or seat capacity
 1C Single span with inadequate seat capacity
 1D In-span hinges with no other superstructure defi ciencies
 2A Single column piers
 2B Three substructure defi ciencies
 2C One or two substructure defi ciencies
 3 Bridges with no vulnerabilities. Timber superstructure bridges.  
  Single-span with adequate anchorage or seat capacity
 4 Missing Plans
 R Fully retrofi tted (Phases I and II)
 D Designed for seismic loads
 S Special analysis required
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f. Bridges falling under Vulnerability Group 3 and built between 1940 and 
1988 will be either “Damaged” for PGA between 0.25g and 0.40g, or will 
be “Collapsed” for PGA of 0.40g or higher.
g. Bridges falling under Vulnerability Group 4 (and built before 1950) 
will be either “Damaged” for PGA between 0.20g and 0.35g, or will be 
“Collapsed” for PGA of 0.35g or higher.
h. All bridges built after 1988 (already designed for seismic loads) 
experiencing a PGA of 0.15g higher than what they were designed for, 
will be “Damaged” but never “Collapsed”.
Figure 4.2 : Horizontal Peak Ground 
Acceleration induced by M 9.0 Cascadia 
Subduction Zone Earthquake
Cascadia Subduction Zone
M 9.0 @ Closest Source Distance
PGA (g)
(from Youngs et. al. 
attenuation relation)
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After establishing the criteria for evaluating the damage state of ODOT bridges 
after this earthquake, the Peak Ground Acceleration Map for this specific 
earthquake was established based on the attenuation relationships from 
Youngs, et. al. (1997) [4] (Figure 4.2). Because of the initial assumptions for bridges 
experiencing a PGA of 0.15g or less, the map of PGA for the M 9.0 Cascadia 
Subduction Zone Earthquake was drawn only for the western part of the state 
where such conditions occur. 
A total of 2,671 bridges were identified to experience a PGA of 0.15g or higher, 
593 of which were single span bridges.  The results of this exercise showed that 
399 bridges would have totally or partially collapsed under a M 9.0 Cascadia 
Subduction Zone earthquake, and 621 bridges would have been heavily 
damaged. The rest of them (1,651 bridges) were identified to be serviceable 
after the strong shaking of this infrequent earthquake.  
Based on this quick and approximate assessment, it was evident that the effects 
of this earthquake was widespread across the most dynamic portion of the 
transportation network. In addition to the heavy damaged along the Oregon 
Coast Highway (US101), many portions of I-5 and US99 would not be traversable 
as well. Also, most state routes connecting Interstate I-5 with the Oregon Coast 
Highway would be closed. The estimated time of closure could be 3 to12 
months, assuming emergency contracting provisions and the use of temporary 
bridges would be used to restore traffic. This would be a temporary solution 
and it would be associated with limitations on load capacity for the majority of 
bridges. The restoration of the entire transportation network could take 3 to 5 
years, and would require a nationwide effort because of the limited workforce 
and resources availability within Oregon.
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Earthquake damage to components along important and non-redundant links within the system will have a greater impact on the system 
performance than will other components.  Hence, components should not 
be treated as individual entities only but on how the extent of its damage 
impacts the highway system performance. Therefore, consideration 
should be given to both systemic and combined effects to have a more 
rational basis for establishing seismic retrofit priorities and performance 
requirements for bridges and other highway components.
Bridge Seismic Vulnerability Assessment of 
the Network
The Seismic Risk Analysis (SRA) methodology is a synthesis of models developed by earth scientists, geotechnical and structural earthquake 
engineers, transportation engineers and planners, and economists. The 
methodology can develop multiple types/forms of results from deterministic 
or probabilistic approaches and from local to large geographic areas. Such 
results can be developed for use in pre-earthquake assessment of various 
options for seismic risk reduction after an actual earthquake. 
To carry out SRA of bridges, tools such as: HAZUS, software developed by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and REDARS 2, software 
for SRA developed by the Federal Highway Administration, can be used. 
These tools typically utilize publicly available databases to define roadway 
topology and attributes, bridge locations and attributes, origin-destination 
(O-D) zones and pre-earthquake trip tables and site-specific NEHRP soil 
conditions. Of these, only REDARS 2 has an integrated ability to analyze the 
transportation network as a system, considering both direct losses due to 
damage and indirect losses due to traffic flow disruption.
The methodology to carry out deterministic or probabilistic seismic risk 
analysis is depicted in Figure 5.1.  For probabilistic SRA, results are developed 
for multiple simulations, in which a “simulation” is defi ned as a complete 
set of system SRA results for one particular set of randomly selected input 
parameters and model parameters. The model and input parameters for one 
simulation may diff er from those for other simulations because of random 
and systematic uncertainties. 
HIGHWAY MOBILITY IMPACTS FROM 
SIMULATED SEISMIC EVENTS
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For deterministic SRA, one set of results is developed either for median input and 
model parameters or for one set of randomly selected parameters. This multi-
disciplinary procedure uses geoseismic, geotechnical and structural engineering, 
repair/construction, transportation network, and economic models to estimate 
hazards, component performance, system performance and losses such as 
economic impacts due to repair costs and losses due to travel time delays. 
Earthquake Scenarios
In a SRA of any lifeline system, scenarios are needed to evaluate systemic consequences of damage of individual earthquakes on components at 
diverse locations. Scenario earthquakes are developed as part of the initialization 
phase of the SRA methodology. In this, regional earthquake models are used 
to develop a table of earthquake occurrences over time, in which each 
earthquake is represented as magnitude and location and the occurrences 
over time characterize the frequencies of occurrence for earthquakes of various 
magnitudes and locations. This tabular listing of earthquake occurrences is used 
in the implementation of probabilistic SRA as a walkthrough analysis (Daykin 
et al., 1994). This approach facilitates development of loss distributions 
from the SRA, estimation of confidence levels and limits of these loss results, 
and display of their variability over time.
The SRA methodology incorporates regional earthquake source models that 
have been adapted from models used by the United States Geological Survey 
(USGS) during their development of seismic hazard maps for the conterminous 
United States (Frankel et al., 2002). The USGS models have been selected 
because of their development by recognized earth scientists and because of 
their subsequent extensive external review process. 
The ground shaking sources that can be used to conduct these analyses are 
shakemaps, walkthrough tables and a point source earthquake.
Shakemap.•   A ShakeMap is a representation of ground shaking produced by 
an earthquake. It is a product of the USGS Earthquake Hazards Program in 
conjunction with regional seismic network operators.
Walkthrough.•   From the Walkthrough Earthquake Selection form and in turn 
pick a walkthrough earthquake by walkthrough year number.
Mag. @ X/Y.  • This is the point-source earthquake selection that consists of a 
magnitude (in g’s) and a location expressed as longitude and latitude. 
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Figure 5.1 : Seismic Risk Analysis of Roadway Systems 
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Description of Typical Expected Damage
Bridge Damage States
W ith modern methodologies, the bridge damage resulting from an earthquake event can be classified into damage states ranging from no 
damage to complete collapse. The bridge model utilized for SRA of the Oregon 
transportation network was based on HAZUS99-SR2, which defines bridge 
capacities in terms of spectral accelerations leading to the onset of five damage 
states listed in Table 5.1 for each of several “standard bridge” classifications. 
Table 5.1 : Damage States considered in HAZUS99-SR2 Bridge Model
Damage State Designation 
Number Level
None   Up to fi rst yield.1. 
Slight Minor cracking and spalling of the abutment,   2. 
 cracks in shear keys at abutment, minor spalling   
 and cracking at hinges, minor spalling of column   
 requiring no more than cosmetic repair, or minor   
 cracking of deck.
Moderate Any column experiencing moderate shear   3. 
 cracking and spalling (with columns still    
 structurally sound), moderate movement of   
 abutment (< 5.1 cm)  (< 2 inches), extensive   
 cracking and spalling of shear keys,  connection   
  with cracked shear keys or bent bolts, keeper   
 bar failure without unseating, rocker bearing   
 failure, or moderate settlement of approach.
Extensive Any column degrading without collapse (e.g.,  4. 
 shear failure) but with column structurally unsafe,  
  signifi cant residual movement of connections,   
 major settlement of approach fi lls, vertical off set   
 or shear key failure at abutments, or diff erential   
 settlement.
Complete Collapse of any column or unseating of deck   5. 
 spans leading to collapse of deck. Tilting of   
 substructure due to foundation failure.
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Once the capacity for a given bridge is estimated, a ground motion model is 
used to estimate the bridge’s site-specific demand ground motions (in terms 
of spectral accelerations Sa(1.0) and Sa(0.3)) for each scenario earthquake. 
The capacity for the bridges is computed including effects of uncertainties. 
However, the capacity modification factors are developed by statistical analysis 
for each damage state and are the mean values. 
Estimation of ground motions for different scenario earthquakes and simulations 
includes effects of uncertainties in earthquake magnitude and location, 
ground motion attenuation characteristics, and soil amplification effects. 
For example, the Abrahamson-Silva (1997) ground motion model estimates 
spectral accelerations caused by shallow crustal earthquakes in active tectonic 
regions of the Western United States, excluding subduction earthquakes. The 
Abrahamson-Silva ground motion model expresses the natural logarithm of the 
ground motion as a function of earthquake magnitude, source-site distance, 
local soil conditions, type of faulting, whether the site is along the hanging 
wall or footwall of the ruptured fault plane, and inter-event and intra-event 
uncertainties. This functionality is represented through a series of numerical 
coefficients that are used to compute each term in this equation.
Once the bridge’s demand is computed for a given scenario earthquake, it is 
compared to each bridge’s capacity that leads to the onset of each damage state 
in order to estimate the bridge’s damage state for the particular earthquake 
and simulation.
Incorporation of the Transportation Network 
To create the Oregon network model, 5 format-specific databases were obtained and modified to the appropriate format.  The 6 categories of data 
required and collected, analyzed and modified to the suitable format were:
 1. National Highway Planning Network Database (NHPN)
 2. Highway Performance Monitoring System Database (HPMS)
 3. National Bridge Inventory Database (NBI)
 4. Supplemental Geotechnical Data (collected by the user)
 5. Traffic Analysis Zone Map of the region (TAZ map)
 6. Origin-Destination Trip Data (O-D Matrices)
These datasets were used to defi ne the transportation network and the 
associated traffi  c fl ow. The bridges become vulnerable links within the network 
and when damaged change the traffi  c demand placed onto the system.
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Estimate of Economic Impact
One of the most important end results from SRA of roadway systems is the estimation of economic impacts of earthquake damage to the system. Bridge 
damage results not only in high cost of structural repair but also safety concerns 
by severely disrupting traffi  c fl ow which in turn will impact post-earthquake 
emergency response, repair and reconstruction operations and long term economic 
consequences due to the valued loss of time when commuter and freight travel 
slows down due to the disrupted network. From this, it is apparent that earthquake 
damage to certain components (e.g., those along important and non-redundant 
links within the system) will have a greater impact on the system performance 
than will other components. Current criteria for prioritizing bridges for seismic 
retrofi t is done by using average daily traffi  c count, detour length, and route type 
as parameters. Earthquakes, in addition to damaging the roadway system, can also 
damage buildings, contents, and lifeline infrastructure which were not considered 
to be part of this highway bridge vulnerability study.
The SRA methodology uses the bridge and network data to estimate direct and 
indirect economic losses due to disruption in the system. The SRA considers 
repair costs, losses due to earthquake-induced travel-time delays and losses from 
trips foregone due to earthquake-induced increases in traffi  c congestion. The 
replacement costs are calculated as a product of a base cost of $165/ft 2, the deck 
area and a factor of 3.2 (to incorporate associated costs such as approaches, traffi  c 
control, etc.) with a $3 million minimum cost. And when estimating the cost of 
a new bridge with an old bridge, a further multiplication factor of 1.2 is used, 
because the new bridge is expected to be of a larger dimension than the old one. 
The repair cost is computed as the product of a repair cost which depends on the 
bridge’s damage state, and replacement cost. 
Equation 1
Replacement Cost = max of
$165/ft • 2 x the deck area x 3.2 x 1.2 (when using a “old” bridge to estimate the 
cost of replacement of a “new” bridge)
$3 million • 
Equation 2
Retrofi t Cost (Phase I) = $35/ft 2 x the deck area 
Retrofi t Cost (Phase II) = $90/ft 2 x the deck area 
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Using the above cost estimates, the inventory replacement value of over 2500 
bridges that are part of the Oregon State Highway system is about $23,700 million. 
Phase I retrofi t cost is a little over $1,200 million and phase II retrofi t cost is about 
$3,000 million. Table 5.2 gives a breakdown of the distribution and replacement 
and retrofi t cost of the bridges along the major highway routes.
 Number of Replacement  Retrofi t Cost Retrofi t Cost
 Bridges Cost (in million $) Phase I Phase II
I-5  (Multnomah to Clackamas) 95 $2,262 $125 $321
I-5  (Clackamas to Lane) 215 $1,611 $84 $215
I-5  (Lane to Jackson) 166 $1,486 $82 $211
I-84 290 $2,630 $142 $366
US-101 143 $1,943 $103 $264
US-26 133 $952 $46 $117
I-205 76 $2,083 $114 $294
I-405 50 $1,179 $53 $137
US-30 38 $431 $23 $59
US-20 80 $399 $19 $49
OR-38 16 $90 $5 $12
OR-42 54 $ 432 $ 24 $61
Others 1213 $8,206 $417 $1,073
Total 2567 $23,704 $1,236 $3,178
Table 5.2 : Replacement value of State Highway Bridges along selected routes.
Route
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The cost of earthquake induced traffi  c disruption is calculated using zone-to-
zone trip demands and the corresponding changes in travel time estimated by 
a variable demand model. This cost includes the value of time due to increased 
traveler time on the roadway and the value of trips foregone. 
Table 5.4 gives average daily traffi  c on major state highways in the State of Oregon. 
These values are the maximum average daily traffi  c values.
Table 5.3 shows the percentage of replacement cost used to calculate repair costs 
for the diff erent damage states after an event. Following existing ODOT practice, 
if the repair cost of a bridge is more than 50% the replacement cost, the bridge is 
typically replaced rather than repaired. Hence, a bridge that is in the “extensive” 
damage state will have the same minimum cost as complete collapse.
Table 5.3 : Average Repair Cost Estimate 




Extensive 100 Min $3 Million
Collapse 100 Min $3 Million
 
 Route Average Daily traffi  c 
I-5 (Multnomah to Clackamas) 155,800 
I-5 (Clackamas to Lane) 94,900 










Table 5.4 : Average Daily Traffi  c on State Highway Bridges along selected routes.
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Oregon Seismic Network Model
Study Area
The focus of the seismic vulnerability assessment has been on bridges lying on or crossing over Oregon highway routes in the area defi ned by Figure 5.2. The area 
includes all highway routes lying inside or west of the I-5 corridor, highway routes 
in the Portland area, the entire length of US-101 and a part of I-84 Columbia River 
Highway. The bridge data was collected to include bridges up to the year 2008. 
In total, the study area includes over 1,900 bridges. Over 1,500 of these bridges 
lie on major routes.  Table 5.5 gives a breakdown of the distribution of the bridges 
on major routes.  Notably, 499 bridges, or 36% of the bridges considered, lie on 
Interstate 5, generally considered one of Oregon’s important routes. Figure 5.3 
breaks down the predominant types of material of bridges considered in the 
assessment.  
Figure 5.2 : Study Area Focus
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Table 5.6 evaluates the predominant types of design of the majority of bridges 
considered in the assessment.  825 (54%) of the bridges considered are of stringer/



































Table 5.5 : Distribution of bridges on major routes   












Table 5.6 :  Distribution of predominant design types in the REDARS 2 Study 
 Highway System Bridges
 Single Span Multi-Span
Stringer/Girder 157 668
Slab 76 140
Multiple Box Beam 61 212
Frame / Girder-Floorbeam 2 30




Single/Spread Box 9 15
Arch-Thru 5 2
Tunnel 0 1




State Earthquake Scenarios Used in Analysis 
The earthquake scenarios considered for this study are subduction zone earthquakes and crustal earthquakes.
Subduction Zone Earthquakes: Though no earthquakes have been recorded on 
the Cascadia Subduction Zone during Oregon’s short 150-year historical record, 
numerous studies have found widespread evidence that very large earthquakes 
have occurred, most recently about 300 years ago, in January 1700 (e.g., 
Atwater, 1987; Yamaguchi and others, 1997). The best available evidence and 
observations indicate that these earthquakes occur on average about every 500 
years. Hence, it is important to make an analysis of a scenario CSZ earthquake 
so as to make a reasonable prediction of the effects of the assumed earthquake. 
This knowledge of potential damage will allow for planning and preparedness 
purposes.
Crustal Earthquakes: Crustal earthquakes occur in the North American plate at 
relatively shallow depths of 10–20 km (6–12 mi) below the surface. The 1993 
magnitude 5.6 earthquake at Scotts Mills, Oregon (Madin and others, 1993) 
and the 1993 magnitude 5.9 and 6.0 Klamath Falls, Oregon, main shocks (Wiley 
and others, 1993) are examples of crustal earthquakes that have occurred in 
Oregon. Consequently, crustal earthquake scenarios are also examined for the 
Oregon model. 
Figure 5.4  itemizes the year construction was completed of each of the considered 
bridges in the model.  The fi gure shows that while 531(35%) of the bridges were 



















































































Figure 5.6 (a) : Component Damage States for a Magnitude 7.0 Scenario EQ around Portland Hills
Figure 5.5  shows the locations of scenario earthquakes for both crustal and 
subduction zone events, that have been included as part of the state wide analyses 
of the transportation network. The locations are selected based on history of 
seismic activity, distance from potentially active faults and proximity to critical 
highway routes.
Crustal Earthquake Scenarios in the Portland 
Metro Area 
For an earthquake scenario of magnitude 7.0 in the Portland Metro Area, there were 5 complete collapses, 48 extensive, 41 moderate and 27 slight bridge 
damage states. The losses calculated were $1,577 million for bridge repair and 
replacement and $68 million travel time related losses. Figure 5.6 (a) shows a map of 
the component damage states in the Portland Metro Area.

















Crustal Earthquake Scenarios in the Klamath 
Falls Area
A magnitude 6.5 scenario earthquake around Klamath Falls resulted in no complete collapses, 7 extensive, 6 moderate and 3 slight damage states. The 
losses were $109 million for bridge repair and replacement and $3 million in travel 
time related losses. Figure 5.7
Figure 5.7 : Component Damage States for Magnitude 6.5 Scenario EQ around Klamath Falls
Crustal Earthquake Scenarios in the Scotts 
Mills Area
For an earthquake scenario of magnitude 7.0 at Scotts Mills, there was one complete collapse, two extensive, two moderate and three slight damage 
states. The losses calculated were $14 million for bridge repair and replacement 
and $29 million in travel time related losses. Figure 5.6 (b)
Figure 5.6 (b) Component Damage States for a Magnitude 7 Scenario EQ around Scotts Mills
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Cascadia Subduction Zone Earthquake near 
Southern Oregon
An earthquake scenario of magnitude 8.3 at the Cascadia Subduction Zone near Southern Oregon produced 2 complete collapses, 23 extensive, 33 moderate 
and 123 slight damage states. The losses evaluated were $363 million for bridge 
repair and replacement and $94 million travel time related losses. Figure 5.8 shows 
a map of component damage states for the southwestern part of Oregon.
Figure 5.8 : Component Damage States for a Magnitude 8.3 Cascadia Subduction Zone Scenario EQ 
near southern Oregon
Figure 5.9 : Component Damage States for a Magnitude 8.3 Cascadia Subduction Zone Scenario EQ near 
northern Oregon
Cascadia Subduction Zone Earthquake near 
Northern Oregon
An earthquake scenario of magnitude 8.3 at the Cascadia Subduction Zone near northern Oregon produced no complete collapses, 28 extensive, 32 moderate 
and 152 slight damage states. The losses evaluated were $336 million for bridge 
repair and replacement and $8 million travel time related losses. Figure 5.9  shows a 
map of component damage states for the northwestern part of Oregon.
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Full Length Cascadia Subduction Zone 
Earthquake 
he Abrahamson-Silva ground motion attenuation model only estimates
spectral accelerations caused by shallow crustal earthquakes in active
tectonic regions of the western United States and excludes the Subduction
Earthquakes. Therefore, for the CSZ earthquake events, a Cascadia Subduction
Zone earthquake scenario ShakeMap is used as a ground shaking source. 
(c)
Figure 5.10 : Scenario ShakeMaps – (a) CSZ magnitude 9.0;  (b) CSZ magnitude 8.3 North; 
(c) CSZ magnitude 8.3 South
(a)                (b)
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Table5.7 : Summary of Seismic Hazard Analysis
Figure 5.11 : Component Damage States for a Magnitude 9.0 Cascadia Subduction Zone Scenario EQ 
An earthquake scenario of magnitude 9.0  at the Cascadia Subduction Zone resulted 
in 6 complete collapses, 64 extensive, 106 moderate and 164 slight damage states. 
The losses calculated were $1,080 million for bridge repair and replacement and 
$177 million travel time related losses. Figure 5.11 shows a map of component 
damage states for the western part of Oregon.
CSZ 9.0 I-5 (Mult-Clack) 5 1 0 0 $8
 I-5 (Clack-Lane) 18 3 1 0 $14
 I-5 (Lane-Jacks) 22 0 0 0 $5
 I-84 10 0 0 0 $3
 US-101 7 14 35 5 $684
 US-26 7 4 0 0 $8
 I-205 8 2 0 0 $10
 I-405 7 0 0 0 $2
 US-30 5 3 2 0 $26
 US-20 4 3 5 0 $19
 OR-38 3 2 1 0 $9
 OR-42 4 13 13 1 $147
 Others 64 61 7 0 $145
 Total 164 106 64 6 $1,080 $177
              Damage States            Economic loss (in Million $)
   Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Bridge Repair/Replacement Travel Time Loss





CSZ 8.3  I-5 (Mult-Clack) 1 0 0 0 $0.4 
North I-5 (Clack-Lane) 18 1 0 0 $5.3 
 I-5 (Lane-Jacks) 0 0 0 0 0
 I-84 7 0 0 0 $2
 US-101 7 18 19 0 $252
 US-26 7 0 0 0 $1
 I-205 4 0 0 0 $1
 I-405 0 0 0 0 0
 US-30 4 2 2 0 $18
 US-20 2 2 4 0 $13
 OR-38 4 0 0 0 $1
 OR-42 4 1 0 0 $5
 Others 94 8 3 0 $37
 Total 152 32 28 0 $336 $8
CSZ 8.3  I-5 (Mult-Clack) 0 0 0 0 0 
South I-5 (Clack-Lane) 19 1 0 0 $5 
 I-5 (Lane-Jacks) 16 0 0 0 $4
 I-84 0 0 0 0 0
 US-101 7 16 11 1 $208
 US-26 0 0 0 0 0
 I-205 0 0 0 0 0
 I-405 0 0 0 0 0
 US-30 0 0 0 0 0
 US-20 8 0 0 0 $1
 OR-38 4 0 0 0 $1
 OR-42 9 10 10 0 $118
 Others 62 5 1 0 $22
 Total 123 33 23 2  364 $94
              Damage States            Economic loss (in Million $)
   Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Bridge Repair/Replacement Travel Time Loss  
















 I-5 (Mult- Clack) 8 11 10 1 $483  
 I-5 (Clack-Lane) 0 0 0 0 0  
 I-5 (Lane- Jacks) 0 0 0 0 0
 I-84 2 4 11 1 $170
 US-101 0 0 0 0 0
 US-26 4 3 7 0 $64
 I-205 5 4 0 0 $14
 I-405 2 11 4 2 $322
 US-30 1 0 1 1 $122
 US-20 0 0 0 0 0
 OR-38 0 0 0 0 0
 OR-42 0 0 0 0 0
 Others 5 8 15 0 $402
 Total 27 41 48 5 $1,577 $68
 I-5 0 0 0 0 0 
 I-84 0 0 0 0 0 
 US-101 0 0 0 0 0
 US-26 0 0 0 0 0
 I-205 0 0 0 0 0
 I-405 0 0 0 0 0
 Others 3 2 2 1 $14
 Total 3 2 2 1 $14 $29
 I-5 0 0 0 0 0 
 I-84 0 0 0 0 0 
 US-101 0 0 0 0 0
 US-26 0 0 0 0 0
 I-205 0 0 0 0 0
 I-405 0 0 0 0 0
 Others 3 6 7 0 $109
 Total 3 6 7 0 $109 $3
              Damage States            Economic loss (in Million $)
   Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Bridge Repair/Replacement Travel Time Loss



























ODOT SEISMIC MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Approximately 2,550 State-owned bridges were screened for seismic defi ciencies as part of the 1993 CH2M HILL Seismic Prioritization Report, 
and a total of 1,670 bridges were found to have insuffi  cient capacity to resist 
earthquake loadings. Using a Unit Retrofi t Cost of $13.00/ft 2 for Phase I seismic 
retrofi t and $32.00/ft 2 for Phase II seismic retrofi t, CH2M HILL estimated a total of 
$223.18 million was needed to retrofi t all bridges needing a Phase I seismic retrofi t 
plus $1,006.95 million for bridges needing a Phase II seismic retrofi t. The above 
fi gures, estimated in 1997 dollars, did not include Engineering and Contingencies 
costs, which vary from 30% to 40% of the construction cost. 
Even though ODOT had developed this very detailed information the Bridge 
Section has not established a comprehensive Seismic Retrofi t Program due to 
the lack of funding resulting in part from bridge programming eff orts being 
focused on resolving structural defi ciencies that impede freight mobility. Under 
these circumstances, ODOT developed a cost eff ective strategy to select bridges 
that would undergo seismic retrofi t. Using a small portion of the Bridge Program 
allocation, ODOT focused on improving longer segments of highways with the 
available funding. In other words, ODOT  did not necessarily retrofi t the most 
vulnerable bridges in the state; instead, bridges which would off er the highest 
mile/dollar improvement (after being retrofi tted) were selected. Additionally, 
bridges at the end of their life cycle were replaced rather than retrofi tted.   
Limited funding allowed ODOT to accomplish only part of the initial goal of 
seismically retrofi tting state bridges. As of 2009, 178 bridges have received a 
Phase I seismic retrofi t. The most typical retrofi t strategy employed was to improve 
the superstructure to substructure connection. This was commonly achieved by 
“tying down” the bridge girders to the respective piers by using restraint cables. 
These cables will accommodate the temperature movements of the structure, 
but also restrain the superstructure from falling off  the bent caps when subjected 
to earthquake induced motions. 
Current retrofi t strategy and summary   
of progress 
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In some cases, the approach involved the replacement of unstable bearings with 
new bearings that would perform better under cyclic horizontal earthquake 
loading. The most common type of bearing used for this phase of retrofi t are 
reinforced elastomeric bearings.  Installing seismic restraint cables and replacing 
unstable bearings was found to be a practical and relatively inexpensive solution 
for providing the most basic retrofi t for the majority of bridges. However, it is 
not the “bread and butter” solution for all vulnerable bridges. In some instances, 
seismic restrainers by themselves would not be able to accommodate the range 
of movement and could not sustain the horizontal forces induced by earthquakes 
for long and heavy bridge spans.  Installation of shock transmission units was 
found to be a very prudent solution for major and heavy structures, like the 
Marquam and Abernethy bridges. 
Installing shock transmission units increases the retrofit cost significantly 
compared to installing seismic restrainers, but it provides a higher level of 
earthquake resistance.  It has been applied only on a few major bridges. 
 The actual cost data for retrofi tted bridges show that the unit prices used by CH2M HILL were unconservatively low.  The unit cost for Phase I retrofi t projects 
turned out to be almost as expensive as the unit price used for Phase II retrofi t in 
CH2M HILL’s estimate.  One factor that had a signifi cant infl uence on this outcome 
Figure 6.1 : Seismic Retrofi t of Marquam Bridge Using Restrain Cables.
Figure 6.2 : Abernathy Bridge – Bearing Retrofi t
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was the selection of individual bridges for retrofi t instead of groups of bridges 
(i.e. bundles), based on their physical location.  However, establishing bundles for 
retrofi t projects was not an option due to the limited funding available.    
In the past few years ODOT has gained experience in the best practices available 
for seismic retrofi tting state bridges. Additionally, the Department was able to 
evaluate the infl uence of diff erent options on project costs. For example, it 
was evident that retrofi tting a bundle of bridges would be less expensive than 
retrofi tting bridges individually (assuming the bridges were closely located), but 
a larger package would require additional funding.
 Currently, there is not enough funding available for ODOT to retrofi t all state bridges with seismic defi ciencies.  However, ODOT should not ignore current 
bridge and public safety vulnerabilities.  For this reason, we have established a 
design policy to include at least a Phase I seismic retrofi t for existing vulnerable 
bridges that are scheduled to undergo other types of rehabilitation.  This method 
is very cost effi  cient since it reduces design and mobilization cost signifi cantly, 
but is considered a temporary solution since it is a slow response to the actual 
large need.  In fact, at this rate, many bridges will be replaced before they can 
be retrofitted, even though funding for bridge replacements is also expected 
to be limited.
Figure 6.3 : Shock 
Transmission Units were 
Installed in Abernathy 
Bridge as Part of The 
Seismic Retrofi t 
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As we are reminded by the latest earthquake strikes around the world, ODOT 
recognizes how devastating post-earthquake conditions might be for Oregon. 
We have also seen that a bad situation can get even worse if emergency response 
is not able to reach those in need due to logistical problems caused by a 
nonfunctional highway network. Valuable time lost in responding to emergency 
situations will be compounded if we lose several bridges along a vital route.
In an eff ort to minimize this possibility, ODOT has chosen to be proactive in 
evaluating Oregon bridges and their performance level under the most common 
earthquake scenarios. Utilizing the data collected from seismic hazard analysis 
conducted using REDARS2 and additional data available in ODOT’s database, the 
Bridge Section has the ability to move toward a strategy for evaluating, prioritizing 
and mitigating the seismic vulnerabilities of state bridges. 
After selecting the major earthquake scenarios that have a reasonable probability 
of occurrence in Oregon, we have analyzed these earthquake scenarios using 
REDARS2 to show the aff ected areas, and determine which are the most vulnerable 
segments on our highway system. With the majority of bridges built before the 
availability of seismic design specifi cations, the extent of the problem or needs 
identifi ed by REDARS2 was not surprising, leaving the Agency with the burning 
question of “where do we go from here?”
ODOT recognizes that retrofi tting all vulnerable bridges in the near future is not 
an option, but we can fi nd ways to start moving in that direction. Under these 
circumstances, the prioritization process of major highway segments, or key 
individual bridges, that are vulnerable under seismic loading will be important 
and necessary.
Giving all earthquake scenarios a similar chance of occurrence in the near future, 
ODOT estimated the economic losses of each major highway segment under 
diff erent earthquake scenarios. These economic losses include the cost to repair or 
replace all bridges damaged from the earthquake, as well as the cost of travel time 
losses. Because of uncertainty of which earthquake may strike fi rst, the maximum 
damage cost for diff erent earthquake scenarios was assigned to each highway 
segment (see Table 6.1). These costs will be an important factor in determining the 
priority of each segment to be retrofi tted.       
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In an eff ort to better utilize any future funding for seismic retrofi t, ODOT has 
attempted to capture the major factors that would make the prioritization process 
reasonable and understandable.  The preliminary results of the algorithm used by 
ODOT to prioritize the seismic retrofi t strategy are shown on Table 6.2.
It seems intuitive that improving longer stretches of highways with lower costs 
would be a key criteria in prioritizing the system.  But ignoring the most populated 
areas of our state would not be astute.  This is why ODOT has considered both the 
Route Length and the Average Daily Traffi  c to be very important factors in the 
retrofi t prioritization process. 
Acknowledging the fi nancial constraints of today’s economy, ODOT has weighted 
Retrofi t Cost heavily, as a determining factor for allocating any future funding. 
Furthermore, the Retrofi t Cost has been compared to the Maximum Earthquake 
Loss for the same highway segment.  This is intended to avoid selecting one route 
over another solely because its retrofi tting cost is less than others.
            
 
I-5 (Multnomah-Clackamas) $13.94 $0.45 $0.00 $511.78 $0.00 $0.00 $511.78
I-5 (Marion-Linn) $20.33 $5.66 $9.33 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $20.33
I-5 (Lane-Jackson) $6.20 $0.00 $5.83 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $6.20
I-84 $5.45 $2.25 $0.00 $181.14 $0.00 $0.00 $181.14
US-101 $771.96 $256.92 $259.25 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $771.96
US-26 $13.79 $1.11 $0.00 $67.72 $0.00 $0.00 $67.72
I-205 $18.39 $1.13 $0.00 $14.94 $0.00 $0.00 $18.39
I-405 $3.08 $0.00 $0.00 $335.97 $0.00 $0.00 $335.97
US-30 $32.03 $18.63 $0.00 $124.27 $0.00 $0.00 $124.27
US-20 $21.05 $13.21 $1.21 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $21.05
OR-38 $9.20 $1.00 $7.30 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $9.20
OR-42 $164.36 $5.09 $144.71 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $164.36
Others* $177.22 $38.25 $31.37 $409.17 $43.00 $112.00 $409.17
Table 6.1 : Route Maximum Earthquake Losses
Bridge Damage Cost + Travel Cost Losses 
from Diff erent Earthquake Scenarios  (in million $)
Route
CSZ 9.0 CSZ 8.3  CSZ 8.3  Portland Scotts Klamath






I-5 (Multnomah-Clackamas) 27.84 155,800 95 $511.78 $125.00 $321.00 $446.00 1
I-405 4.21 113,400 50 $335.97 $53.00 $137.00 $190.00 2
I-84 149.65 171,400 290 $181.14 $142.00 $366.00 $508.00 3
OR-42 77.17 24,800 54 $164.36 $24.00 $61.00 $85.00 4
US-30 99.34 48,695 38 $124.27 $23.00 $59.00 $82.00 5
US-26 128.87 152,000 133 $67.72 $46.00 $117.00 $163.00 6
US-101 363.11 27,000 143 $771.96 $103.00 $264.00 $367.00 7
I-5 (Marion-Linn) 77.26 94,900 215 $20.33 $84.00 $215.00 $299.00 8
I-205 27.18 176,225 76 $18.39 $114.00 $294.00 $408.00 9
OR-38 57.23 4,700 16 $9.20 $5.00 $12.00 $17.00 10
US-20 76.80 22,700 80 $21.05 $19.00 $49.00 $68.00 11






Table 6.2 : Preliminary Route Seismic Retrofi t Prioritization Ranking
Route Average Number Maximum Phase I  Phase II Total
Length Daily of  Earthquake Retrofi t Retrofi t Retrofi t
Traffi  c Bridges Bridges Loss Cost Cost Cost
(in miles) (in vehicles)  (in million$) (in million$) (in million$) (in million$)
 
Striving to optimize the algorithm for seismic prioritization, ODOT has included a 
variety of other important factors that have an infl uence on the effi  ciency of the 
program.  Aware that part of our highway system will be heavily damaged due 
to severe landslides in an earthquake, it is probably not prudent to spend money 
retrofi tting old bridges along these segments.  Even if bridges in areas prone 
to landslides survive an earthquake, it would take time to re-establish roadway 
approaches. Other factors, such as importance of a route for freight movements, 
inter-state borders, and major river crossings, are considered important factors of 
the algorithm. 
It is important to understand the results of this report are the product of a 
preliminary study by the Bridge Section of ODOT, intended to refl ect the 
vulnerability of state-owned bridges and to highlight the approximate funding 
needed to retrofi t them. ODOT understands these results will be further refi ned 
by stakeholder involvement and additional study. This report is intended to 
disseminate currently available information and to stimulate conversation or 
debate on new strategies or responses.  A wider review by other ODOT sections, 
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such as Roadway, Freight Mobility, Maintenance, Operations and Planning, can 
provide valuable input that would help the Bridge Section in the future refi nement 
of this report. Furthermore, Bridge Section will complete a more refi ned study, 
which will analyze each individual bridge on identifi ed vulnerable routes. This 
Phase 2 report will allow ODOT to make specifi c recommendations on seismic 
retrofi t priorities, considering the factors mentioned in this report and other more 
detailed considerations.
The vulnerability of Oregon bridges is a real concern, and ODOT understands what 
it takes to mitigate it. However, ODOT recognizes that a wider audience must be 
engaged in determining the optimum bridge mitigation strategy to protect public 
safety and infrastructure investments.  
RECOMMENDATIONS
In the short term continue to refine the Oregon State Highway Bridge Seismic 1. 
Vulnerability and Mitigation Strategy report by working with stakeholders 
to define the highest priority and most cost effective mitigation strategies 
and routes.
Publish this initial Report widely to communicate and educate stakeholders 2. 
and highway users on  potential damage and options for mitigation.
Continue the strategy of including Phase I seismic retrofit to bridge repair 3. 
and rehabilitation projects in the Statewide Transportation Improvement 
Plan (STIP).
Add Phase I seismic retrofit as a selection criteria in the Major Bridge 4. 
Maintenance program for a few of the highest priority bridges as a way to 
begin some making progress in achiving a minimum level of seismic safety on 
the Interstate of other essential routes.
Add seismic mitigation as one of the selection and prioritization criteria in the 5. 
Bridge Program of the STIP.
Provide support to update the existing designation of lifeline routes.6. 
Work with stakeholders to define a long term comprehensive study of seismic 7. 
vulnerability and risk for the entire transportation system to develop an 
overall perspective on resulting mobility and essential service related impacts 
after a major seismic event. Include consideration of landlsides and highway 
fills, local roads systems, and access to critical facilities such as fuel depots 
and utility delivery systems.  This study will be useful to fully understand the 
seismic risks facing the State.
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Additional Notes on REDARS 2 Model
Earthquake Impacts on Highways
In the scenarios considered, highways I-5, I-84, US-101, I-405, US-26, US-20, US-
30, OR-38, and OR-42 have extensive damage or collapse. Other local bridges not 
currently incorporated into the model are also likely to experience damage as 
well as failure of the roadways due to other earthquake related aff ects including 
potential land slides and liquefaction. 
Impacts – Immediate
Bridges represent vulnerability points within a transportation network. Hence, 
damaged bridges will have a great impact on the system performance causing 
severe traffi  c congestion statewide. This disruption of traffi  c fl ow will in turn impact 
post-earthquake emergency response, repair and reconstruction operations.
Recovery Issues
Single bridges on some major routes may be replaced with in a year. However, it 
will probably take over 5 years to replace 70+ bridges due to limited resources. 
Another issue in recovery of the network system is that some streets cannot carry 
the increased traffi  c volumes that could possibly be diverted to them. 
Impacts – Long term
Severe traffi  c congestion will occur for at least a year. Movement of goods to 
fi nal destinations – for example, manufacturers, retail outlets, and hospitals-will 
be much slower for a long period of time.  This will have long term economic 
consequences due to the valued loss of time when commuter and freight travel 
slows down due to the disrupted network. A commute to work that took 30 
minutes could take hours; and businesses will suff er due to this disruption and 
may even move from Oregon elsewhere.
Analysis results and interpretation
Damage states of bridges are computed by fi rst computing the bridge’s demand 
spectral acceleration for a given scenario earthquake, it is then compared to each 
bridge’s spectral acceleration capacity that leads to the onset of each damage state. 
However, these median values of ground motion computed do not necessarily 
represent the exact levels of ground shaking at the bridge locations since the exact 
levels of ground shaking of an earthquake will not be known without actually 
recording the motion with strong motion accelerators at the time of the event. 
Consequently, there is a probability that some bridges might perform better 
or worse during a real earthquake compared to a scenario analysis. In addition, 
fragility values are based on probabilistic median expected performances. A 
particular bridge that had a specifi c damage state may not exactly correlate to 
actual events but is more representative as the expected damage state. For these 
reasons, the aggregate response over the route should be examined and is more 




The Study only applies to state-owned bridges in western Oregon, 1. 
Klamath Falls area and the western and central Columbia River Gorge. No 
consideration of possible failures of landslides and fills on state highways or 
of local roads and bridges was included.  
The relative probability of occurrence of the six earthquake scenarios was 2. 
not considered in the prioritization of route segments.
The study does not consider settlement or lateral spreading due to 3. 
liquefaction. 
Traffic costs include the cost to reroute traffic to other open state highways, 4. 
but not to the local road system.
The algorithm used to prioritize route segments does not consider the 5. 
relative probability of occurrence of the representative earthquakes.
Acknowledgements:  
This report was prepared by the ODOT Bridge Seismic Committee 
(Albert Nako, Craig Shike, Jan Six and Bruce Johnson) 
with assistance from Portland State University (Peter Dusicka and Selamawit Mehary).  
Editing and publishing was done by Dawn Mach and Chittirat Amawattana.
Oregon Department of Transportation 
Bridge Engineering Section
November 2009
Mitigation Strategies To Reduce Major Mobility Risks




Seismic Vulnerability of Oregon State Highway Bridges
